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Activists 
John C. Green, University of Akron 
James L. Guth, Furman University 
Lyman A. Kellstedt, Wheaton College 
Corwin E. Smidt, Calvin College 
A central _feature of democratic regimes is routine and vigorous 
challenges to those in power. Such challenges require both legal 
protection for civil liberties and popular support for the norms of 
political tolerance. On the surface, the American regime is substantially 
democratic, enjoying vital opposition and constitutionally protected 
civil liberties . But deeper investigation reveals that popular support for 
civil liberties has often been remarkably low, threatening the actual 
operation of democracy. Indeed, the mass public's intolerance has led 
some scholars to contend that civil liberties are preserved only by the 
values of the "political strata" of elites and activists. Even among them, 
however, critics have found a distressing lack of tolerance, particularly 
among some of the most vigorous challenging groups. 
Protestant fundamentalism and other forms of religious 
traditionalism have long been identified as wellsprings of such "uncivil 
challenges," from Gerald L. K. Smith and Charles Coughlin in 1930s, 
through Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis in the 1950s, to Jerry 
Falwell and Pat Robertson more recently (Ribuffo 1983). Less colorful 
and controversial religious activists have often been suspected of 
intolerance as well (Streiker and Strober 1972). Seldom, however, have 
such evaluations been based on survey evidence on grass-roots religious 
activists , relying instead on inferences from the pronouncements of 
leaders and the association of religiosity with political intolerance in the 
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mass public. Indeed, religious activists, like other elements of the 
political strata, have received less scrutiny than warranted by the 
expectations of theorists (Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, and Roberts 1985). 
In this essay, we take a systematic look at support for civil 
liberties in a large sample of religious activists, members of groups 
which have recently challenged the power structure from the right and 
from the left. We find that religious activists resemble their secular 
counterparts in most ways with respect to tolerance, but more 
importantly, that religious factors have a special impact. In line with 
conventional wisdom, we discover that fundamentalism is indeed 
connected with intolerance, but we also find that other dimensions of 
religion are either unrelated to, or actually foster support for, civil 
liberties. We argue that "uncivil" challenges from religious groups 
originate in broad pessimism about the practices and products of 
politics as usual, while more "civil" challenges reflect narrower 
grievances and a more optimistic view of the political process. Both are 
rooted, however, in divergent theological perspectives. 
Religious Activists, Political Challenges, and Civil 
Liberties 
Religion has often been a source of challenges to the dominant 
American political order. After all, the Revolutionaries invoked divine 
authority to sanction their rebellion, an example followed by many 
"unruly" (Gamson 1975) movements thereafter. This tendency was 
encouraged by constitutional arrangements which facilitate religious 
mobilization in politics: the First Amendment's prohibition of a 
religious establishment and guarantee of free exercise combined with the 
great diversity of American society to produce a vital and variegated 
religious community. Operating in this environment, religion has been 
a potent resource for many challenging movements, from abolition to 
civil rights, as well as for more routine opposition via the ballot box, 
the bar, and the lobby. 
Of course, religious activists have also sided at times with the 
status quo and opposed challenging groups with great vigor, especially 
when these demanded innovations in social roles and behaviors (Berger 
1967). Nevertheless, one must resist the temptation to think of 
"conservative" religion as part of the American "establishment": even 
when socially traditionalist, religion has been a potent source of 
political opposition and dissent. The Christian Right is just the most 
recent example of a conservative religious challenge to state power 
(Wilcox 1992). In fact, conservative and liberal believers have often 
expressed similar grievances and often used the same beliefs in their 
challenges, a point well illustrated by the 1988 presidential campaigns 
of Pat Robertson and Jesse Jackson (Hertzke 1993). 
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Religion is an important source of opposition to regime policies 
because it can mobilize both institutions and beliefs. First, the 
religious can often activate strong, grassroots institutions that are both 
independent of the state and repositories of valuable resources such as 
money, organizational skills, and most important, highly committed 
members. Second, religion produces powerful worldviews and 
allegiances among many adherents. Such beliefs can make religious 
institutions distinctive and often put them at odds with political 
arrangements. Drawing on transcendent authority for standards of 
behavior, religious leaders routinely critique the "powers of the earth" 
on a wide range of topics. Their constant reinterpretation of beliefs in 
light of everyday experience can provide an ideological focus for 
political opposition and dissent. 
Ironically, in challenging the American political order religious 
activists are often accused of not respecting the very civil liberties 
which permit such challenges. How valid is this charge? The literature 
on tolerance provides some clues about the political tolerance of 
religious activists. First, research has consistently shown that the 
political strata are markedly more tolerant than the mass public, so 
religious activists may be more supportive of civil liberties than the 
religious mass public. But second, the two major explanations advanced 
to account for tolerance, elite socialization and ideological dominance, 
both suggest there may be considerable variation in tolerance among 
religious activists. 
Beginning with Stouffer (1955) and supported by a host of other 
studies (McClosky and Brill 1983; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; 
Jackman 1972), scholars have argued that the political strata are more 
tolerant because elites have learned and relearned the value of civil 
liberties through a variety of mechanisms. Formal education is crucial 
to this process because it expands individual choice, broadens social 
horizons, and inculcates libertarian norms. In the same ways, the 
cosmopolitan culture of large cities and professional occupations creates 
greater tolerance. In addition, youth has been strongly associated with 
tolerance because of the increasingly libertarian themes of popular 
culture experienced by those coming of age since World War II and, 
especially , since the 1960s (Roof 1993). Participating in public affairs 
also socializes and resocializes activists to libertarian norms: more 
informed and active individuals develop tolerance through the rough and 
tumble of politics (Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, Barnum, and Gibson 
1993). 
From this perspective, tolerance is the product of individual 
development, part of a broader constellation of democratic procedural 
values that distinguishes the political strata from the public. This view 
has been challenged by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), 
however, who adopt a more explicitly political view of tolerance. Using 
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innovative methods which allowed respondents to choose the group 
they disliked most, Sullivan found the United States to be characterized 
by "pluralistic intolerance. " Intolerance is widespread because most 
citizens are intolerant of some group which they fear or intensely 
dislike. Ideology influences the choice of "target" group: citizens fear or 
dislike groups on the far side of the political spectrum. Thus, on the 
surface, liberals and conservatives are just as likely to support civil 
liberties, but for different kinds of groups, and the greater tolerance of 
the political strata is largely an artifact of survey measures asking about 
groups that elites and activists do not fear. Similarly, the final 
distribution of tolerance is a product of both ideological predispositions 
and choice of target groups: when all factors are considered, liberals are 
more tolerant than conservatives, in part because of general ideological 
support for democratic norms, and in part because of the fewer threats 
perceived from the groups they dislike (Sullivan et al. 1982, 232-236). 
This line of research argues that perception of threat is central to 
tolerance and has three components. First, the specific activities which 
are to be tolerated matter. Behaviors that are potentially dangerous or 
damaging are less likely to be accepted. Second, the nature of the target 
group is important: "dangerous" or "antidemocratic " groups are less 
likely to be tolerated. Third, the level of hostility citizens hold toward 
the political process also has an effect. Those who feel marginalized or 
maligned by politics as usual are less likely to be tolerant. 
Previous research using the Sullivan technique on political 
activists has revealed that "pluralistic intolerance" is not an accurate 
description of their views, but that tolerance is indeed associated with 
ideology (Guth and Green 1991). Overall, liberal activists are the most 
tolerant, but their support for civil liberties is part of a broader political 
agenda. Their libertarian values are part of an "ideology of rights," 
dedicated to the expansion of substantive advantages for groups they 
support. Conservative activists are less tolerant, in large part because 
they oppose the liberal "rights" agenda. Thus, activists' attitudes toward 
controversial social issues advanced by contemporary movements are 
central to explaining their support--or lack of it--for civil liberties. 
Religion plays an important role in both elite socialization and 
ideological explanations of tolerance. Religious training is an element 
of socialization and religious beliefs are an important component of 
ideology . Numerous studies have found that absence of religiosity or 
"secular detachment" (often correlated with cosmopolitanism) is an 
important source of tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982, 135-139). For 
many theorists , religiosity has the opposite effect of education and 
living in cosmopolitan environments: religious belief reduces the range 
of individual choice, social involvement, and support for libertarian 
values. Religious commitment supposedly reinforces the "dogmatic" 
tendencies of belief. Beside their negative impact on socialization into 
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libertarian norms, religious beliefs routinely underlie political ideology, 
particularly in the political strata (Green, Guth, and Fraser 1991). Such 
connections vary by religious tradition, of course, but within each 
tradition, doctrinal orthodoxy is often linked to political conservatism, 
particularly on social or moral issues, while more heterodox beliefs are 
associattd with more liberal views (Smidt and Penning 1982; Beatty 
and Walter 1984). 
Religiosity and orthodoxy aside, certain doctrinal systems would 
seem to have particular relevance. Here we focus on a very important 
American Protestant movement: fundamentalism. This term is 
commonly misused in popular and scholarly discourse to refer variously 
to strict doctrinal orthodoxy, extremely strong religious commitment, 
or intense dogmatism. While fundamentalism can be associated with 
these traits, it properly refers to a specific theological outlook that arose 
among Protestants early in this century in opposition to modernist or 
liberal theological trends, eventually extending to a thorough critique of 
modern society (Marsden 1980). Fundamentalists insisted on the 
inerrancy of the Bible, belief in the "fundamentals" of historic Christian 
orthodoxy, and ecclesiological and social separation from those who did 
not accept these beliefs. Fundamentalists were also heavily influenced 
by "End Times" thinking, encouraging them to "save" all the souls 
they could before the Second Coming of Christ (Boyer 1992). ' 
This understanding of the nature of the world, religious truth, and 
the future sharply restricts the range of individual choice, social 
connections, and acceptance of legitimate differences of opinion. 
Fundamentalists are pessimistic about the world, interpreting life as a 
cosmic struggle between God and Satan, where there is no margin to 
tolerate "error" nor those who accommodate it. A literal reading of 
Scripture, especially the prophetic visions in the Old and New 
Testaments, provides the warrant for this and other convictions, 
including confidence in the imminent return of Christ to join in a 
cataclysmic battle that will end human history. In addition to the 
theological elements of fundamentalism which reduce support for civil 
liberties, several cultural tendencies of the movement might also 
produce less support. The deep antagonism that fundamentalists have 
towards the modem world may reduce their exposure to and appreciation 
of different kinds of people and ideas. Along these lines, 
fundamentalists are deeply concerned with the "moral decay" of the 
country, producing strongly conservative views on social issues, which 
may contribute to intolerance. Finally, fundamentalists view 
themselves as victims of "cultural aggression" by the political 
establishment, and this sense of threat could affect support for civil 
liberties as well. 
These fundamentalist views, coupled with the prodigious 
intellectual effort undergirding their many variations, arose to counter 
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modernist or liberal theologies which attacked Manichean worldviews, 
ahistorical readings of sacred texts, and detailed apocalyptic scenarios 
(Hutchinson 1976). By their very nature, such critical departures from 
the "old time religion" enhanced individual choice, encouraged social 
interaction, and legitimated disagreement even on sacred things. Thus, 
modernist or liberal theological perspectives, which focus on more 
"worldly" conflicts, could have the opposite effect from fundamentalist 
doctrine, expanding libertarian values, promoting liberal attitudes, and 
encouraging a benign view of the political system. 
In sum, then, religion is an important source of challenges to the 
political system, and there is reason to believe that fundamentalist 
religious challenges may be associated with intolerance. Like other 
elements of the political strata, religious activists are likely to be more 
tolerant than the public, but the distribution of tolerance among them is 
likely Lo reflect the same factors as their secular counterparts. More 
specifically, religiosity and orthodoxy are likely to reduce tolerance, 
particularly among activists influenced by fundamentalism. By the same 
token, modernist or liberal theology may be associated with support for 
civil liberties. 
Data and Methods 
This study is based on a national mail survey of religious activists 
taken in 1990-91. A stratified random sample was drawn from the 
membership of eight prominent interest groups with ties to religious 
communities, deliberately chosen to span the ideological spectrum. 
Several of the groups are central to the Christian Right, others are 
drawn from a less publicized Christian Left, with the rest falling in 
between. 1 The survey generated a 56.9% return rate for a total of 4,995 
usable returns of a ten-page, 250-item questionnaire. 
1The groups sampled included: Bread for the World, an anti-hunger 
lobby founded in 1973; JustLife, a political action committee in operation 
from 1986 to 1993, which promoted a "consistent life ethic" on abortion, 
economic justice and the arms race; Evangelicals for Social Action, formed 
in 1978, represents progressive evangelicals on a range of political and 
social issues; the National Association of Evangelicals is the primary voice 
of Evangelical Protestantism dating from 1942 and the counterpart to the 
mainline National Council of Churches; Prison Fellowship was founded by 
Chuck Colson in 1976 and lobbies for prison reform; Focus on the Family 
has been led by its founder, radio psychologist James Dobson, since 1977 
and advocates traditionalist family policies; Americans for the Republic, a 
political action committee created to finance Pat Robertson's 1988 
presidential campaign was the base for the Christian Coalition, an interest 
group which organizes evangelicals at the grassroots; Concerned Women 
for America is an evangelical organization advocating traditional values 
since 1978. For more details see Smidt, Kellstedt, Green and Guth (1994). 
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To tap support for civil liberties, we modified the Sullivan et al. 
(1982) "content-controlled" measure for a mail instrument. The item 
asked: "Many people believe there are dangerous political organizations 
and groups in America today. Would you name THE political 
organization that you regard as MOST dangerous to the country right 
now?" After a space for the answer, the respondent was asked if the 
group just named should be allowed to make political speeches, run 
candidates for public office, demonstrate in the community or teach in 
public schools, and if the government should be allowed to outlaw the 
group or tap their telephones. In each case, the response categories were 
"yes," "not sure," and "no." We ask a similar set of questions in a 1982 
survey of a broader sample of political party and interest group 
activists, allowing us to put the present sample in context (Guth and 
Green 1991). 
We used these data to develop Tolerance and Group Threat scales. 
The Tolerance scale summed the three-point responses to the six 
activity items into a single thirteen-point scale, ranging from fully 
intolerant to fully tolerant responses. This scale is highly reliable 
(alpha=.82) and versions of it using only the most highly correlated 
items generated very similar results . This Tolerance scale serves as the 
dependent variable in following analysis. The Group Threat scale was 
constructed in two steps. First, the groups named by the respondents 
were recoded into nine categories according to a combination of 
ideological (liberal to conservative) and procedural criteria (reflecting the 
extent to which the groups named had a history of not respecting 
democratic procedures), with "extremist left" (communists, socialists) 
and "extremist right" (Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis) anchoring each end, 
and "centrist" groups (more moderate ideological groups, the major 
political parties) filling in the middle (see Table 1). This categorization 
was then recombined into a three-point scale to isolate the procedural 
dimension of target group selection, with all "extremists" at one end 
and "centrists" at the other. In the following analysis, this Group Threat 
scale is used to control for the potential threat of the groups targeted. 
Tolerance among Religious Activists 
Just how tolerant are these religious activists? Table 1 gives an 
overview of our measures of support for civil liberties. First, note that 
like other elements of the political strata, religious activists are quite 
tolerant: nearly two-thirds would allow a group regarded as "dangerous" 
to make a public speech, and more than three-fifths would prohibit the 
government from tapping telephones or outlawing the group. A similar 
proportion would allow the group to run candidates for office. On the 
other hand, only slightly more than one-half would allow the group to 
demonstrate in their community, probably reflecting their concerns 
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about the potential for violent confrontation, and only one-fifth would 
allow a member to teach in public schools, exhibiting the special 
sensitivities associated with education (Jelen and Wilcox 1990). Such 
patterns are consistent with previous research: distant and purely 
political activities are more acceptable than those closer to home and 
less clearly political (Gibson 1987a). Indeed, the demonstrating and 
teaching items add significantly to the variation in our Tolerance scale. 
And religious activists seem more sensitive to these activities than their 
secular counterparts. 
Table I 
Support for Civil Liberties Among Religious Activists 
(N=4384) 
Would Allow "Dangerous " Group To: 
Make a speech in a public place 
Prohibit government to tap telephone 
Prohibit government to outlaw group 
Run candidates for public office 
Demonstrate in respondent's community 
Member teach in the public schools 
Tolerance Scale: 
Top quarter (highly tolerant) 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Bottom quarter (highly intolerant) 
Percent of Sample 
65.5 
63.5 
61.4 
61.1 
55.0 
20.9 
49.8 
13.0 
19.9 
17.3 
Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey . 
As a group, religious activists compare quite favorably with the 
mass public and other political activists . For example , 50% of 
Sullivan's 1978 Twin City mass sample would allow a public speech 
by a dangerous group and only 19% would allow teaching in public 
school (Sullivan et al. 1982); Gibson's {1987b) national sample showed 
50% and 18% on these same items, respectively. In contrast, our 1982 
political activist study found that 81 % would allow a public speech and 
52% teaching in public school. Thus, these religious activists stand 
between other activists and the mass public on the most tolerated 
activity, speech, but resemble the mass public on the activity least 
tolerated, teaching in public school. Over all, religious activists look 
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more like their secular counterparts than like the mass public, however, 
with almost one-half falling into the top one-quarter of our Tolerance 
scale (Guth and Green 1991). 
The religious activists differ markedly from the 1982 sample, 
however, in the groups they chose as dangerous. As Table 2 shows, 
only about one-twentieth listed extremist left groups, almost five times 
fewer than the 1982 sample of activists (5% versus 24%), and more 
than one-fifth named extremist right groups, more than twice the 
number in the broader sample (22% versus 10%). The difference is made 
up by listings of more mainstream liberal and conservative groups; the 
Table 2 
Group Threat and Support for Civil Liberties 
Among Religious Activists 
(N=4384) 
Dangerous Groups 
Extremist Left 
Feminist, Pro-Choice 
Secularist 
Other Liberal 
Centrist 
Other Conservative 
Anti-feminist, Pro-Life 
Christian Right 
Extremist Right 
Group Threat Scale 
Extremist Groups 
Mainstream Ideological 
Centrist Groups 
Percent of Sample 
Naming Type 
of Group 
5.1 
22.5 
31.8 
4.2 
7.9 
4.1 
0.7 
1.8 
21.9 
27.0 
56.7 
16.2 
Percent Naming 
Group In Top 
Quarter of 
Tolerance Scale 
29.8 
44.0 
49.8 
50.0 
53.3 
79.5 
91.8 
93.3 
49.l 
45.4 
52.4 
58.8 
Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey. 
former are nearly twice as common here (58% to 27%) and the latter 
almost six times less frequently named (6% to 29%). Some of these 
differences from the 1982 sample reflect the changed political world: 
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communists and other leftists no longer dominated the international 
headlines in 1991. Nevertheless, religious activists clearly have 
distinctive contemporary concerns. Feminist groups, such as NOW and 
pro-choice organizations, receive much attention, and special ire is 
reserved for "secularist" groups, perceived as hostile to religion, such as 
People for the American Way and the ACLU. (In fact, the ACLU was 
by far the most commonly mentioned group.) On the other side, 
Christian Right and pro-life groups are barely mentioned, even by 
liberal activists, who oppose them politically but apparently do not 
regard them as dangerous. About an equal number of standard liberal 
(e.g. environmentalists) and conservative (e.g. business) groups are 
mentioned, nearly matching the number of centrist groups such as the 
major parties. Taken together, these mainstream groups are less 
commonly named than secularists and feminists , but much more feared 
than Christian Rightists and their allies. 
Table 2 also shows the distribution of tolerance across the kinds of 
groups named . Only about one-third of those mentioning extremist left 
groups fall in the top one-quarter of the tolerance scale, while about 
one-half of those naming extremist right groups are highly tolerant. 
Those naming feminist and secularist groups are much less tolerant 
than those mentioning pro-life, Christian Right, or centrist groups. 
Finally, Table 2 provides some evidence on the Group Threat scale, 
revealing that the nature of the group named is linked to tolerance 
Table 3 
Ideological Cluster and Support for Civil Liberties 
Among Religious Activists 
Ideological Cluster 
Christian Right 
Traditional Conservatives 
Christian Moderates 
Pro-Life Liberals 
Christian Left 
(N=4384) 
Percent in Top Quarter 
Of Tolerance Scale 
41 
42 
53 
71 
73 
Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Study 
quite apart from ideology: respondents listing extremist groups are 
much less tolerant than those who list centrist groups. 
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Ideology is not only a factor in target group selection, but in the 
civil liberties granted target groups as well. Some direct evidence on 
this point is presented in Table 3. Using the numerous political items 
in the survey, we divided respondents into five opinion clusters: the 
"Christian Left," "Pro-Life Liberals," "Christian Moderates," 
"Traditional Conservatives," and the "Christian Right" (cf. Smidt, 
Kellstedt, Green and Guth 1994). Note the monotonic increase in the 
proportion of each group in the top quarter of the Tolerance scale. 
Clearly, liberal activists are more tolerant, resembling the liberal social 
movement activists surveyed in 1982. The Christian Right activists are 
the least tolerant, matching the figures for the 1982 representatives of 
the Christian Right, but also paralleling the patterns for business and 
conservative activists (Guth and Green 1991). Taken together, all these 
measures show that religious activists resemble the broader activist 
corps, including considerable variation in tolerance linked to ideology 
and perceived threat. 
The Correlates of Tolerance 
What accounts for the variation in tolerance among these religious 
activists? Table 4 offers some evidence on the religious, political and 
demographic correlates of tolerance, beginning with bivariate 
correlations in the first column, followed in the second column by the 
results of a regression analysis for each category of variables, and 
finally in the third column, a regression analysis combining all of the 
variables . To simplify presentation, Table 4 reports the results for 
scales combining a number of specific variables, which are of some 
interest individually and will be discussed in the text. 
Religion. This survey contains extensive batteries of religious 
questions which provide a detailed look at the link between religion and 
support for civil liberties. Analysis of these questions produced three 
measures that were negatively and persistently associated with tolerance: 
fundamentalism, charismatic beliefs, and piety. We also included other 
measures of religion more commonly used in other studies of tolerance, 
such as religious tradition, Christian orthodoxy, religious salience and 
religious involvement. As we shall see, although these facets of 
religion are often correlated with tolerance at the bivariate level, this tie 
disappears when other variables are taken into account. 
Our fundamentalism scale captures adherence to the essential 
doctrines of that movement (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991) . Of the 
component elements, our measure of "religious separatism" {the belief 
that true Christians remain separate from the "world") shows the single 
largest bivariate correlation with tolerance among the fundamentalism 
items (-.27), rivaling the impact of education. Religious separatism is 
followed closely by Biblical literalism, also a central doctrine of 
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fundamentalism (-.26), and then by belief in the "rapture" of the church 
(-.23), Biblical prophecy (-.21), and a premillennial view of Scripture 
(-.17), all closely linked to yet another "fundamental," the Second 
Coming of Jesus Christ. 2 Other fundamentalist beliefs and 
identifications also correlate negatively with tolerance, including the 
historicity of Adam and Eve (-.22), opposition to women clergy (-.20), 
conversion by a sudden "born again" experience (-.17), fundamentalist 
self-identification (-.17), and belief in the inherent sinfulness of human 
nature (-.10). Respondents who reject these views (and are found at the 
other end of the fundamentalism scale) are strikingly more tolerant. 
This evidence also reveals the analytic importance of separating 
fundamentalism from religious orthodoxy or simple piety. We find 
doctrinal orthodoxy per se is not part of the fundamentalism scale (even 
though most fundamentalists are quite orthodox). Beliefs central to 
historic Christianity, such as salvation only through Jesus Christ, that 
He was fully God and fully man, and the historicity of the Virgin Birth 
and Resurrection are not associated with intolerance once 
fundamentalism is taken into account. Many orthodox activists are, in 
fact, quite tolerant. Much the same applies to religious tradition: 
Evangelical Protestants (the category including most fundamentalists) 
are modestly less tolerant than the Mainline Protestants and Catholics, 
but this association also fades once adherence to fundamentalist doctrine 
is controlled (cf. Jelen and Wilcox 1990).3 And, finally, other measures 
sometimes correlated with intolerance in previous research, such as 
religious salience and church involvement, are not related here, once 
fundamentalism is in the equation. 
Two other religious measures are closely tied to tolerance in the 
bivariate analysis, but do not persist in the final regression. Piety 
(including witnessing, attending revival meetings, frequent prayer and 
Bible reading) and charismatic beliefs (belief in the "second baptism" of 
the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues, and Pentecostal or charismatic 
identification) are both negatively linked to tolerance, perhaps reflecting 
the intense social experiences associated with these activities. But it is 
their link with fundamentalism and other non-religious factors that 
accounts for their relationship with intolerance. 
2The elements of fundamentalism are so closely linked as to make 
distinctions among them difficult. However, careful multivariate ~alysis 
suggests that Biblical literalism has the strongest independent effect on 
tolerance, followed by premillennialism, and separatism, although all three 
have similar magnitudes . 
3Our measure of religious tradition includes Evangelical Protestants, 
Mainline Protestants and Catholics. We posited that political tolerance 
would be lowest among Evangelicals, higher among Mainliners, and 
highest in the Catholic tradition . For more detail on religious traditions, 
see Leege and Kellstedt (1993). 
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Among these activists, then, fundamentalism is strongly related to 
Table4 
Correlates of Tolerance 
Among Religious Activists 
Religious Variables 
Fundamentalism 
Orthodoxy 
Charismatic 
Tradition 
Piety 
Involvement 
Salience 
Multiple r 
r2 
Political Factors 
(N:4384) 
Bivariate 
Correlation 
(r) 
-.29* 
-.16 
-.13 
-.09. 
-.07 
-.06 
-.01 
Christian Militancy -.35 
Social Conservatism -.28 
Information Use .27 
Target Group Scale .18 
Economic Conservatism -.13 
Political Participation .14 
Multiple r 
r2 
Demography 
Education 
Age 
Cosmopolitan 
Geooer 
Multiple r 
r2 
.32 
-.20 
.18 
-.14 
Categorical 
Regression 
(beta) 
-.29 
.ns 
-.10 
.ns 
-.06 
.ns 
.ns 
.32 
.12 
-.24 
-.12 
.16 
.20 
-.06 
.13 
.37 
.14 
.25 
-.16 
.08 
-.08 
.36 
.13 
Combined 
Regression 
(beta) 
-.16 
.ns 
.ns 
.ns 
.ns 
.ns 
.ns 
-.20 
-.10 
.11 
.20 
.ns 
.12 
.09 
-.10 
.07 
-.05 
.57 
.33 
* All coefficients significant at the .05 level or better; .ns = not 
significant 
Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey. 
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intolerance, and its nemesis, theological modernism or liberalism, is 
conducive to support for civil liberties, while broader measures of belief 
and religiosity show no independent association. These findings may be 
an artifact of this special sample, but the very crude measures of 
religion used in nearly all studies of civil liberties probably obscure as 
much as they reveal about the specific religious forces which influence 
tolerance. We are confident that precise doctrinal measures will produce 
more accurate results even in mass samples (Leege and Kellstedt 1993). 
Political Factors. Given that this is a sample of the political strata, 
it should come as no surprise that political variables are strongly 
associated with tolerance. Once again, in Table 4 a large number of 
attitudinal items were reduced to three measures associated with support 
for civil liberties. The most important is what we call Christian 
militancy, which shows the largest negative relationship with tolerance 
at the bivariate level and holds much of its power in the combined 
analysis. Social conservatism and economic conservatism are also 
negatively associated with tolerance, but only the fonner is significant 
in the combined analysis, having about one-half the impact of Christian 
militancy. As noted above, Group Threat is negatively linked to 
tolerance, and its effects persist in the combined analysis, matching the 
effects of militancy. Finally, the sources of political information and 
level of political participation also contribute to support for civil 
liberties, rivaling the impact of social issues, but in the opposite 
direction. Each measure deserves a detailed explanation as well. 
The Christian militancy scale is made up of a fascinating 
combination of attitudes. The strongest is the view that the country 
needs a "Christian" political party (r=-.34 with tolerance). This demand 
is closely connected with other attitudes: that candidates' religious 
beliefs are important in vote choice (-.28); that there is one correct 
"Christian" view on political issues (-.28); that a diversity of moral 
views does not "create a healthy society" (-.23); that social problems 
would be solved if "enough people were brought to Christ" (-.21); and, 
that religious people need "special protection for their rights" today (-
.21). These items reveal a deep-seated distrust of the political process, 
accompanied by an aggressive response to being a "mistreated minority" 
rather than a "moral majority." These patterns are confinned by answers 
to an open-ended question on the most serious problems facing the 
nation: Christian militants list more political process problems than 
non-militants. Conversely, a more optimistic view of the political 
process is associated with greater tolerance. 
The Group Threat scale parallels the militancy scale conceptually: 
respondents who fear groups with a history of not respecting democratic 
norms are less tolerant, as the literature predicts. But Christian 
militancy and Group Threat are unrelated statistically and represent 
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different phenomena: the former reflects perceived threats from the 
political process, while the latter measures threats from particular 
groups within the process. Although it may be tempting for some 
observers to ascribe personal alienation or rigid personalities to 
respondents who feel these threats, there is little evidence on either 
point in this survey. 4 What is clear, however, is that concern with 
moral decay and the consequent disorder are also strongly associated 
with the perception of threat for many activists. 
The connection between the threat of disorder and tolerance is 
amply illustrated by three items not used in the analysis. First, 
respondents who disagreed with the statement that "We should be more 
tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral 
standards even if they are very different from our own" were much less 
tolerant than those who agreed (35% versus 74% in the top quarter of 
the tolerance scale). Similarly, respondents who disagreed with allowing 
the "followers of Reverend Moon" the same access to public school 
classrooms before and after school as other religious groups were less 
tolerant than those who agreed (20% versus 74%), and those who felt 
that the drug problem was so serious as to require "sacrifice" of civil 
liberties were also less tolerant (34% versus 69%). These data suggest 
an unwillingness to accept behaviors likely to unravel the social fabric, 
and little respect is accorded those who advocate or defend such 
behaviors. To be sure, other activists feel the social fabric threatened by 
economic injustice, environmental degradation--and even a loss of civil 
liberties! Not surprisingly, such views are associated with tolerance. 
Social issue conservatism also has an independent impact on 
tolerance, confirming previous findings (Guth and Green 1991). 
Important items in this measure include opposition to gay rights (-.36); 
support for school prayer (-.25); opposition to providing birth control 
information in schools (-.22) and to teaching evolution without also 
teaching creationism (-.21); support for capital punishment (-.21); 
opposition to affirmative action (- .20), support for regulating 
pornography (-.20), and a pro-life position on abortion (-.18). All these 
involve controversial questions of substantive rights; opponents of 
expanding substantive rights to liberal constituencies are less 
supportive of procedural rights, and vice versa. 
The positive role of information sources and political participation 
on tolerance supports the findings in the literature concerning the 
socializing and resocializing effects of engagement in public affairs 
(Sullivan et al. 1993). Our information index combines the use of two 
4 Although some earlier scholars argue for a psychological explanation 
for tolerance (cf. Sullivan et al. 1982), we have no direct measures of 
psychological rigidity or dogmatism . Although a few of our religious and 
political measures may seem to tap those dimensions, we suspect that they 
are better thought of as ideological characteristics, not psychological ones. 
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different kinds of media: religious sources that are used principally by 
conservative religious communities and public sources used by 
everyone. Religious media use is negatively associated with tolerance, 
including religious television (-.21), religious radio (-. 19), direct mail (-
.12), and the clergy (-.09). On the other hand, use of public media is 
positively associated with tolerance: newspapers (.14), news magazines 
(.13), opinion magazines (.11), and radio news (.07). When all these 
items were combined into a single scale, ranging from high and 
exclusive religious media use to high and exclusive use of public 
sources, the results are impressive: information use is one of the largest 
correlates of tolerance at the bivariate level, rivaling the impact of 
education and fundamentalism . Political participation shows a similar 
impact. While many forms of political activity were not associated with 
tolerance, actions that involve the exercise of civil liberties were. These 
include contacting public officials (.13), participating in a boycott 
(. 10), writing a letter to the editor (.08), participating in a 
demonstration and signing a petition (both .07). An additive index 
using these items was employed in the analysis. Although participation 
has roughly one-half the impact of information sources at the bivariate 
level, it persists in multivariate analysis, and eventually exceeds the 
importance of information sources in the combined analysis. 
In conclusion, a host of political variables influence tolerance. 
These include perceptions of threat from the political system, particular 
groups, and rivals on substantive issues. These findings confirm earlier 
researchers' arguments on the political nature of support for civil 
liberties. In addition, as political theorists have long argued, the 
socializing and resocializing effects of involvement in public affairs 
enhance tolerance as well. 
Demography. What about the influence of broader forms of 
socialization identified in the literature? Do age, gender, education and 
cosmopolitan demography influence tolerance in this relatively high 
status sample of religious activists? In line with previous studies, 
education is strongly and positively associated with tolerance, rivaling 
fundamentalism and social conservatism. Cosmopolitanism shows a 
smaller positive effect, while age and gender have modest negative 
associations. All of these variables survive multivariate analysis, 
although age ranks first in the combined analysis.5 
5College major was coded according to the liberal nature of the course of 
study, with social science and humanities majors at one end of the scale and 
applied majors at the other . The kind of college attended was coded 
according to the prestige of the institution, ranging from elite universities 
to community and Bible colleges. Occupation is also coded according to 
prestige, with "New Class" professions at one end of the scale and blue-
collar employment at the other . Income is coded in a standard fashion . 
Place of residence is coded according to size of place, ranging from rural 
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Our education measure is actually made up three variables, all 
strongly related to tolerance: years of education (r=.30), college major 
(.26), and the kind of institution attended (.24) . The combination of all 
three factors captures the libertarian impact of formal education (Selvin 
and Hagstrom 1960). Age also had the expected relationship with 
tolerance; activists under 35 years of age hold the most libertarian 
values and those over 65 the least. Exposure to cosmopolitan culture 
has a similar impact, with higher status occupation (.17), higher 
income (.11), and metropolitan residence (.10) making positive 
contributions. Interestingly enough, region is not associated with 
tolerance here: southerners are only modestly less tolerant than other 
activists . Because of the large number of conservative women in this 
sample, gender has a negative impact as well, representing one place 
where religious activists differ from their secular counterparts: gender 
has no impact in broader samples . So, cosmopolitan demography is 
associated with tolerance independent of fundamentalism and political 
attitudes. 
Sources of Tolerance 
How do the correlates of tolerance fit together? Figure 1 and the 
accompanying table provide the results of a path analysis designed to 
estimate the overall impact of these variables . Although the model 
portrayed in Figure 1 is by no means complete, it represents a plausible 
set of relationships among the correlates of tolerance, and has been 
previously employed in the literature (Sullivan et al. 1982, 213; Guth 
and Green 1991, 337). The demographic variables (including education, 
gender, age, and cosmopolitanism) and fundamentalism are assumed to 
be the most distant sources of tolerance. (To simplify the diagram, 
direct effects of these variables are identified by parentheses at the 
bottom of the diagram, and indirect paths less than .1 are excluded.) 
Information sources and political participation are assumed to be the 
next most distant sources of tolerance, holding an intermediary position 
between demography and fundamentalism, on the one hand, and 
political attitudes and tolerance, on the other. Political attitudes are then 
assumed to be the most proximate sources of tolerance, including the 
Group Threat scale, Christian militancy, and social conservatism . 
Education and fundamentalism are strongly and negatively related to 
one another even in this sample of high status activists, a finding that 
would surprise neither secular academics nor fundamentalist clergy. This 
starkly reflects the division between the modem, secular worldview and 
the anti-modem stance of religious traditionalists. Both sides of this 
dispute have important effects on other correlates of tolerance. On the 
areas and small towns to major metropolitan areas . 
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Genller 
Fundamentalism 
Militancy 
Group Threat Scale 
Social Issues 
Age 
Gender 
Cosmopolitanism 
Pol. Participation 
Information Use 
Education 
Figure 1 
Sources of Tolerance 
Path Analysis 
Total Effects 
-.37 
-.25 
-.20 
-.17 
-.12 
-.09 
.08 
.13 
.16 
.19 
Direct Effects 
-.16 
-.20 
-.20 
-.10 
-.10 
-.05 
.07 
.12 
.11 
.09 
-.20 
TOLERANCE 
r=.33 
Indirect Effects 
-.21 
-.05 
-.07 
-.02 
-.04 
.01 
.01 
.05 
.10 
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one hand, education is positively associated with other measures of 
cosmopolitan demography, public information sources, and political 
participation, revealing the standard relationship between higher social 
status and political activity. Not surprisingly, education is also 
negatively linked to militancy. On the other hand, fundamentalism is 
positively associated with the use of religious information sources, the 
Group Threat scale, and social issue conservatism. The large number of 
conservative women in this sample gives gender a role comparable to 
fundamentalism, but with a smaller magnitude. And not surprisingly, 
the use of public information sources and political participation are 
positively related to one another, while Christian militancy and social 
issue conservatism show a similar connection. 
What is the net effect of these relationships? The combination of 
moderate direct impact and strong indirect effects makes fundamentalism 
the largest negative influence on tolerance, followed distantly by the 
measures of threat on the strength of their direct effects: the Group 
Threat scale, Christian militancy, and then social conservatism. Age 
and gender are also negatively related to tolerance, but al a lower level, 
while cosmopolitanism, participation, information use and education 
are positively associated, in ascending order. Education roughly matches 
the total impact of the Group Threat scale on tolerance, and all the 
demographic variables have one-third to one-half the impact of 
fundamentalism. 
We can now summarize the impact of religion on tolerance. 
Fundamentalists are indeed less supportive of civil liberties than other 
religious activists, though not perhaps as severely intolerant as some 
observers suppose. Their special worldview reduces support for civil 
liberties directly, but it also helps generate a higher level of perceived 
threat, an aggressive distrust of the political process, and intense 
concern about moral decay, all of which reduce tolerance. All these 
effects are intensified through the use of specialized religious sources of 
information and less cosmopolitan demography, particularly among 
women. On the other hand, non-fundamentalists, many of whom are 
quite orthodox and committed believers, are much more tolerant. This 
pattern results in part from the libertarian tendencies of modernist 
theology, but also because religious liberals have a reduced sense of 
threat, less hostility toward the political system, and fewer concerns 
about traditional morality. Cosmopolitan demography, especially 
higher levels of education, and fuller engagement in public affairs 
undergird these patterns. Of course, this situation is exactly what 
fundamentalists have long feared and vigorously opposed: the erosion of 
traditional values by the modem world. Indeed, the open embrace of 
alternatives lo the "old time religion" by many of these highly religious 
activists gives credence to their complaint. 
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That fundamentalism should be the basis for any form of political 
action, let alone challenges to authority, is quite surprising. 
Throughout most of its history the movement has been aggressively 
apolitical and harshly critical of such "worldly" entanglements by 
religious people. Instead, fundamentalists dedicated themselves to 
saving souls from the sinful world before the end of human history left 
them to eternal damnation. No doubt fundamentalists were less tolerant 
than other people on these counts, but since they eschewed public 
affairs, their incivility usually went unnoticed. 
At least three times in this century, however, fundamentalists have 
burst into the public square with a vigorous and uncivil challenge to the 
political establishment Each time political observers were shocked by 
their appearance and stunned by their aggressiveness, including an 
apparent lack of respect for democratic norms (Wills 1990). Numerous 
explanations for these unexpected challenges have been advanced, most 
focusing on the personal inadequacies of fundamentalists, but the most 
satisfactory explanations emphasize rational political concerns as the 
most important factors (Wilcox 1992). 
Our findings offer an insight relevant to both the sudden 
politicization of fundamentalists and the uncivil nature of their 
challenges . Simply put, fundamentalists are goaded into politics by 
sharp deviations from traditional morality that are accepted, or worse 
yet, endorsed and promoted by public authorities. Such a moral 
imperative provokes an angry reaction. Not only does it distract from 
otherworldly concerns, it threatens the well-being of humanity on a 
cosmic scale. Those who advocate such immorality are thus seen as 
serious threats, while the political system that allows them to flourish--
and harasses "God's people" when they fight back--is viewed with great 
hostility. Indeed, fundamentalist challenges to the modem world are 
"defensive offensives" (Glazer 1987) designed to stave off moral 
calamity until the Lord's work on earth is completed . Thus, the very 
motivation for political action reduces the civility of their politics. 
The more civil challenges of modernist or liberal religious activists 
also rest on moral imperatives: racial oppression, war, poverty, or 
environmental degradation goad modernists to seek "what the Lord 
requires." But unlike fundamentalists, these activists are more 
accommodated to the modern world. Liberal theology embraces 
ambiguity and complexity, reducing certainty about God's purposes and 
plans. Attention is shifted from individual sin to communal injustice, 
and approximating God's standards in this world becomes the focus of 
concern. Concern with worldly problems leads most directly to worldly 
solutions, including political action . Although the intensity of such 
politics surely varies, modernists are likely to be involved on a regular 
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basis. The use of and support for civil liberties thus comes naturally to 
liberal religionists, even in the face of strong moral imperatives . 
Thus religion can produce both civil and uncivil challenges to "the 
powers that be." It is important to realize that it is not religion per se 
that generates intolerance, but fundamentalist theological perspectives. 
And although uncivil challenges are surely problematic, they may be 
valuable forms of opposition and dissent nevertheless , calling the 
concerns of large segments of the population to the attention of the 
political establishment. The longer-term question is whether the 
involvement of fundamentalist activists will threaten the procedural 
safeguards that guarantee their own activity. Beyond the various 
constitutional and legal safeguards for civil liberties, it seems likely to 
us that those religious activists who venture into politics for sustained 
activity will find the socializing effects of participation itself an 
important restraint. Indeed, fundamentalists who find the tolerance 
required for coalition-building and legislative compromise distasteful are 
likely to revert to the separatist religious pursuits which have long 
characterized that community. 
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Appendix 
We use numerous multi-item measures of religion and ideology. 
These are factor scores isolated and derived by principal components 
analyses with varimax rotations. The lowest reliability score was a 
theta of .62 for the piety measure. These measures differ only slightly 
from measures used in earlier analyses reported in Guth, Kellstedt, 
Smidt and Green (1993a and 1993b). 
Fundamentalism: Biblical literalism, separatism, civil law should 
be based on Old Testament law, human sinfulness, self-identified 
fundamentalism, the rapture of the church, premillennialism, Old 
Testament prophecy, the historicity of Adam and Eve, women's 
ordination, and born again experience. 
Orthodoxy: Jesus the only way to salvation, historicity of Jesus' 
Virgin Birth and resurrection, and Jesus fully God and fully man. 
Charismatic beliefs: belief in the second baptism of the Holy 
Spirit, self-identified charismatic or Pentecostal, speaking in tongues. 
Piety: witnessing, attending revival meetings, frequency of private 
prayer and Bible reading. 
Involvement: church membership, attendance, activity, and number 
of friends in congregation. 
Christian militancy : need for Christian party, social ills solved by 
bringing people to Christ, one correct Christian view on politics, 
religion of candidates important, only one correct moral philosophy, 
newer lifestyles lead to social breakdown, religious people need special 
protection. 
Social conservatism: support for traditional family, local regulation 
of pornography, opposition to the ERA, AIDS is God's punishment, 
ban gays from teaching public school, birth control information in 
public schools, teach creationism along with evolution, opposition to 
abortion, support for school prayer, and support for capital punishment. 
Economic conservatism: world hunger, raise taxes to help the 
needy, raise taxes to reduce budget deficit, environmental protection, 
affirmative action. 
Other measures are explained in the text or notes. 
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